' so as to prefer the science of forgetting to that of remembering; and I am grateful to the famous Simonides of Ceos, who is said to have first invented the science of mnemonics. There is a story that Simonides was dining at the house of a wealthy nobleman named Scopas at Crannon in Thessaly, and chanted a lyric poem which he had composed in honour of his host, in which he followed the custom of the poets by including for decorative purposes a long passage referring to Castor and Pollux; whereupon Scopas with excessive meanness told him he would pay him half the fee agreed on for the poem, and if he liked he might apply for the balance to his sons of Tyndareus, as they had gone halves in the panegyric. . . . a little later a message was brought to Simonides to go outside, as two young men were standing at the door who earnestly requested him to come out; so he rose from his seat and went out, and could not see anybody; but in the interval of his absence the roof of the hall where Scopas was giving the banquet fell in, crushing Scopas himself and his relations underneath the ruins and killing them; and when their friends wanted to bury them but were altogether unable to know them apart, as they had been completely crushed, the story goes that Simonides was enabled by his recollection of the place in which each of them had been reclining at table to identify them for separate interment; and that this circumstance suggested to him the discovery of the truth that the best aid to clearness of memory consists in orderly arrangement. He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select localities and form mental images of the facts they wish to remember and store those images in the localities, with the result that the arrangement of localities will preserve the order of the facts, and the images of the facts will designate the facts themselves, and we shall employ the localities and images respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it.' 1 What emerges from Yates' s erudite analysis of this anecdote are two complementary forms of mnemonic practice: on the one hand, an iterative recipe for memorization, subordinated to the pragmatic demands of rhetoric; and, on the other, an instrument that enables one to build models for structuring and presenting knowledge. 2 It is curious, then, that both Cicero' s tale of memory' s origins and its resurrection by Yates are predicated upon an act of forgetting: forgotten are the dead, the victims of the catastrophe, in whose service Simonides undertook his memorial feat. De-faced, 3 the victims cannot be individually known, the one distinguished from the other. Simonides reconstitutes the destroyed spatial arrangement by virtue of having preserved it internally, having written it on his soul. He gives the dead back their faces by remembering where they sat. In subsequent citations of the legend, though, the process of memorization, the internal writing of order and its elements on the mind, becomes the focus. Forgotten quite is the memorial service itself. As Stefan Goldmann has suggested, the legend of memory' s invention in Cicero (as, later, in Quintilian) enacts the forgetting or erasure of a mythic past wherein memory was closely associated with a cult of mourning. 4 The mythic, cultic past remains present in Cicero' s story only in its traces-in the use, for example, of the word effigies to denote the mental images. His story is instead directed at constituting a new paradigm of knowingthat limits, to quote Renate Lachmann, "the ways of representing the world . . . to the ways in which its elements can be found again." 5 Unremembered, too, are the twin gods, Castor and Pollux, whose aura hovers over Cicero' s account. The catastrophe, both of the event and of almost forgetting its victims, begins with an indirect insult to the heavenly pair. They reappear in the form of the two young men who call the poet away, thus saving him from the fate that befalls the revelers-without, however, revealing their divine nature. To this double and ultimately unacknowledged intervention, Simonides remains the sole witness. Indeed, he needs to survive if only to testify by his near escape to the power of the gods and the dangers of transgression.
That the revenging gods are double suggests a further implication of this originary and cautionary tale. Since, by remembering their places, Simonides is able to give the unidentifiable dead back their names, memory emerges as a form of doubling, a re-presentation of what had gone before: not in its living presence but in its image, its name. The act of remembering the dead is an act of reproducing as names the individual images occupying the loci engraved in the poet' s mind. Lachmann draws attention to the connection between the divine twins and memory' s labor: Castor and Pollux personify mnemonic doubling as such. They constitute a synchronic echo of the temporal doubling with which the story is concerned: the movement from life to death wherein the corpses become the doubles of the revelers. Pollux, the son of Zeus, refused immortality unless he could share it with his brother, Castor. Zeus allowed the brothers to spend their days alternately "in the upper air, and under the earth at Therapne," oscillating thus between life and death, as both living persons and ghostly revenants. 6 The Simonides anecdote not only supplies in nuce a model for mnemonic theory and practice through the early modern period; it also interweaves a number of thematic strands that will guide this investigation of Shakespeare' s Comedy of Errors. Barbara Freedman refers to this early comedy as "a nightmare vision in comic form." What she terms a "truly terrifying fantasy" of a "sudden, inexplicable" deracination of identity derives in no small measure from the play' s awareness of the elements identified above: the close bond linking memory, justice, and death; the disseminative effects of doubling; and the problem of naming. 7 To these elements one more must be added: money. Early in Cicero' s story, Scopas' s refusal to tender the contracted payment for poetic labor upsets the "balance" between men and gods, unleashing the ensuing catastrophe. 8 Memory will partially restore the equilibrium by enabling burial and mourning. A comparable configuration obtains in The Comedy of Errors. Through the material mark that connects memory and market, memory' s discontents are tightly bound to the logic of mercantile exchange-as are the redemptions through which the play ultimately "deliver[s]" (5.1.285) its protagonists from both past and present losses. 9 
DIVIDED MEMORIES
The successes and failures of memory are especially prominent in the two scenes that frame the play' s main action, 1.1 and 5.1. Distinguishing itself from the ensuing action by its "protracted expository narrative," the play' s opening scene focuses almost exclusively on recalling what is past, the "sever[ing]" of Egeon from his "bliss" (1.1.118), and is disjunctively positioned with respect to the comic confusions of the eleven scenes that follow. 10 At the duke' s urging, Egeon "dilate[s] at full" (l. 122) the tale of the "unjust divorce" (l. 104) between himself and his wife, the separation of the two pairs of twins, and his futile search for his lost son. As Patricia Parker astutely notes, the extended narration of the shipwreck, which "splitted" Egeon' s family "in the midst" (l. 103), is governed by the rhetorical figure of the chiasmus, rendered visible in the stratagem that Egeon employed to save them. He divided the pairs of twins and fastened them to the ship' s mast, so that he and his wife, at opposite ends, could "Fix . . . our eyes on whom our care was fixed" (l. 84). This chiastic figure emblematizes, in Parker' s words, "the sense of crossing or exchange which dominates the play right from this opening scene. . . . an emphasis appropriate in any case to a scene where this father faces death precisely because he has crossed an absolute dividing line" between the two "adverse towns" (l. 15) of Syracuse and Ephesus. 11 Egeon' s recollection of the past, in which he "speak[s] . . . griefs unspeakable" (l. 32), immediately qualifies the ostensible immutability of ducal justice, staying the sentence of death for a few hours. As the duke, Solinus, puts it:
Now trust me, were it not against our laws, Against my crown, my oath, my dignity, Which princes, would they, may not disannul, My soul should sue as advocate for thee. But though thou art adjudgèd to death, And passèd sentence may not be recalled But to our honour' s great disparagement, 9 The scene stages the successive failure of the communal bonds of memory, whose task it was to stabilize the self by reflecting back its identity. As Dromio reminds Egeon, memory gathers the self into a distinct identity (re-members) by means of reciprocal recognition: "Ourselves we do remember, sir, by you." Egeon' s hope that the memory of names would spur his son' s recognition and thus "deliver" him gives way to a delusory trust in the memory of faces. Antipholus' s insistence that he has never before seen Egeon then evokes a final, equally vain attempt to register identity and presence through the voice: "But tell me yet, dost thou not know my voice?" The failure of even this minimal demand leads to Egeon' s plaintive expression of loss and self-division: As if to undo the play' s farcical lightness, Shakespeare lingers on Egeon here so as to capture the pathos of his dilemma. The distortion of time-which writes "strange defeatures in [the] face," "crack[s] and split[s]" the tongue-forces an unbridgeable gap between two temporal instantiations of the self: self-presence cannot be sustained since time divorces the self from its reflection (and confirmation) in the memory of others. The repeated play on the words bound and bond underscores the difference between Dromio and Egeon. The former-the bo(u)ndman, in itself a socially fixed identity-knows who he is, despite being unbound, because he is reminded of himself by Egeon' s "bound" condition. Egeon, on the other hand, cannot be who he is because he cannot establish his identity in the face of its denial by others ("and whatsoever a man denies, you are now bound to believe him" [ll. 305-6]). Time divides Egeon, producing a revenant who threatens to undo him and usurp his place. Hence even the first of the successive anagnorises that will ultimately restore Egeon to himself is tinged by doubt: "Egeon, art thou not? or else his ghost" (l. 337), Antipholus of Syracuse uncertainly asks. Freedman writes that, with Egeon,"the play enacts a fantasy of confronting and integrating split-off parts of the ' self ' in time. The tempest that divided Egeon from his wife literally divided his past and present, marital and single identities as well, represented by Egeon' s separated twin sons." 12 The two Antipholi of Ephesus and Syracuse, she suggests, correspond to the two faces of Egeon: the settled, married merchant and the lonely, wandering sojourner. Faced by the twinned versions of the father, the duke wonders "which is the natural man, / And which the spirit? Who deciphers them?" (ll. 333-34).
Time' s "deformèd hand" renders visible, one might suggest, a doubling or a splitting that inheres in memory, and the bridging of which is indeed memory' s crucial task. In the play' s concluding scene, the doubling takes the form of a gap between one' s own memory and one' s reflection in the memory of others. The effect of such a division is an unraveling of identity, a dissolution of "self ": The pathetic insistence on his own memory remains Egeon' s final (and tenuous) refuge. But in the course of his complaint, the different parts of his body take on lives of their own, paradoxically becoming "witnesses" to wholeness at the very instant of self-division: the tongue detaches and divides, the "grainèd" face is subjected to the winter' s severities, the eyes become "wasting lamps," the ears "dull" and "deaf." The inefficacy of memory is emphasized by how abruptly Antipholus of Ephesus rejects his father' s heart-wrenching plea:"I never saw my father in my life" (l. 319).
MEMORY'S DOUBLES
The perfect figures for memory' s divisive work in these framing scenes seem to me none other than the doubled doubles who wreak such havoc in the body of the play. Like the twin gods in Simonides' s story, they simultaneously hold out the promise of the self ' s survival and threaten its putative singularity. 13 As has often been noted, the other crucial Shakespearean modification of Plautus' s Menaechmi is the addition-probably inspired by Plautus' s Amphitruo-of a second pair of estranged twins, the two Dromios, "perplexed . . . mediators" who shuttle, in
The heuristic Aristotelian distinction developed in De memoria between zoón and eikón, or "figure" and "copy," brings into relief the paradox of memory represented by these pairs of twins. Aristotle likened the memory-image imprinted on the mind to a "figure drawn on a panel," which is both "a figure and a copy": insofar as "it is something in its own right, it is an object of contemplation [theorema] or an image [phantasma] . But in so far as it is of another thing, it is a sort of copy [oion eikón] and a reminder [mnemóneuma] ." 15 To the premise that memory operates through mental images, Aristotle adds the requirement that the image be a likeness or copy of the thing remembered-for an eikón is both similar to and derived from the original of which it is an image. The qualification that the figure is a "sort of " copy suggests a functional distinction between two ways of looking at the same image-as "picture," that is, for itself, and as cue or signal. But Aristotle tends nonetheless to treat the memorial cue as also bearing a formal likeness to the original. 16 As a consequence, Aristotle' s account of memory wavers between a functional and a formal understanding of the terms zoón and eikón.
As long as figure and copy can be distinguished, the structure of memory remains stable, reinforcing the ontological priority and distinctness of the remembered object. However, the demand for likeness introduces a potential instability. As the debate between Theuth and Thamus in Plato' s Phaedrus underscores, the duplicative structure of memory is marked from the outset by the possibility that the copy (eikón) will supplant and usurp the genuine figure (zoón), which alone can lead one back to the represented source. Such a possibility is not one that Aristotle directly raises. But the very choice of the word eikón to denote the memory image qua copy bears witness to Plato' s presence in Aristotle' s treatise. 17 16 The reasons for this emphasis on likeness are complex. As Sorabji argues, all objects of thought must, for Aristotle, have a sensible vehicle and a physical location. A convenient vehicle is the sensible form existing in physical objects, whose image is placed, via the act of perception, in one' s sense organs (and subsequently taken up by common sense, imagination, and memory). In De anima, however, Aristotle does not seem to believe that just any image will do. Rather, images need to be to some extent like what one wants to think of: one remembers either by focusing on selected features of a particular image or through an image that acts as a small-scale model. Precisely this gray area, where functional and formal approaches intersect, is crucial to uncovering the underlying instabilities in the workings of memory, and is skillfully exploited in Shakespeare' s play. 17 Plato certainly attributes to the eikón a range that seems often to exceed any simple notion of likeness to an original object or concept: time is called eikón of eternity (Timaeus), ideal names the eikónes of what they stand for (Cratylus), and physical things the eikónes of ideal Forms (Republic). Nonetheless, as Sorabji emphasizes, there is a limit:
The Cratylus, which insists that an eikôn lacks some features of the original, also insists that it must be reasonably similar to the original. Not any name will be an eikôn, but only one in which most letters ory of recollection (which posits ideal Forms, the objects of dialectical thinking, as existing separately from the physical world), Aristotle stresses the corporeal nature of all thought processes, including those of memory. Nonetheless, he retains the Platonic emphasis on likeness and similarity as characteristic of the images through which we conceptualize and remember. 18 The dangers posed by likeness are identified in Plato' s Phaedrus and connected there to the problem of writing and specifically to a form of pictographic writingEgyptian hieroglyphs. When Theuth claims that his invention of writing will "make the Egyptians wiser and . . . improve their memories [,] for it is an elixir of memory and wisdom," Thamus replies:
Most ingenious Theuth, . . . you, who are the father of letters, have been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of those who learn to use it, because they will not practice their memory. Their trust in writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented an elixir not of memory but of reminding; and you offer your pupils the appearance of wisdom, not true wisdom. . . . 19 The history of the iconoclastic impulse in the West testifies in part to the anxiety aroused by the potential substitution of an external, mechanical image for memory' s inner imaging on the animo, and the usurpation of figure by copy. The underlying fear, marked in Plato' s text by this ambivalent relationship to writing, renders uncertain the possibility of having access to the "truth," to the original object being represented.
The syncretic impulses of the early modern period led to Aristotle and Plato being combined around precisely this problem of image and substitution. Edward In using the word eikón, then, Aristotle engages-and to a degree absorbs-a strand of Platonic thought regarding the role of images in thinking and memory. Press, 1990 ), 138-68, esp. 140. Contra Carruthers' s assertion, the anxiety that the appearance of wisdom will take the place of true wisdom, that the fixation on external writing will deflect from the inner writing, seems to me clearly signaled in this Platonic anecdote. The most extended analysis of this episode remains Jacques Derrida' s Dissemination (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981), 102ff.
wrestles with the problem of how to reconcile Aristotelian image theory with the comprehension of such ideal entities as escape the physical senses:
Now the mind of man in Understanding, is but as wax to the seale, or as a Table  and Picture to an Object which it represents: which is the ground of that Paradox in Aristotle, that in understanding[,] the Soule is (as it were) made the Object that is understood. Because, as the Wax, after it is stamped, is in some sort the very Seale it selfe that stamp' d it, namely Representative, by way of Image and resemblance; so the Soule, in receiving the species of any Object, is made the picture and image of the thing it selfe. Now the understanding, being able to apprehend immortality (yea indeed apprehending every corporeall substance, as if it were immortall, I meane by purging it from all grosse materiall and corruptible qualities) must therefore needs of it selfe be of an immortall Nature. 20 Reynolds' s discussion strives, tortuously, to merge Platonic and Aristotelian strains. He guarantees the soul' s immortality by transposing onto it the character of what is impressed upon it, as the wax becomes "in some sort" the seal whose stamp it bears. Crucially, the process depends on the soul being "made. . . . Representative," in the double sense of becoming an exemplar of and similar to the "very Seale it selfe." By combining Plato' s wax block with the Aristotelian distinction between eikón and zoón, Reynolds stresses the way in which the eikón-or "the picture and image of the thing it selfe"-transforms the original material substrate by lending it a shape. In being able to "apprehend" immortality, the understanding, too, creates itself in the image of what is imaged upon it,"purging" itself of "grosse" and "corruptible" materiality. The mind of man is thereby "made"-"after it is stamped"-into the "very" thing it seeks to comprehend. Through resemblance and substitution, we might say, the eikón of immortality paradoxically constitutes the zoón of the human soul/understanding in its own image.
As the anecdote of Simonides reminds us, there is a long tradition that conceives the work of memory as a writing of images on the soul. A pendant to the constitutive dimension of such an "inner" writing is the notion that writing in the narrow sense potentially undermines memory. Indeed, the idea that the external written mark may substitute for an inner writing on the soul (the "original" preserved in memory) recurs through the Middle Ages and into the Renaissance in the distinction between memory for words and memory for things. Mary J. Carruthers' s suggestive study of memory in medieval culture posits these as complementary, and doubtless the overarching continuities in mnemonic practice bear out her claim that one does not choose absolutely between memorizing word-for-word and retaining the gist in memory. Nonetheless, her argument demands the bracketing of infelicities to which memorial acts are prey. For a persistent murmur in the texts she cites concerns the fear that knowing the word may substitute for knowing the thing."[I]t is," as Carruthers' s summary puts it,"best to remember res rather than verba, for one can suit words to the res as occasion demands (' de tempore') and not run the risk of needing prompting or forgetting altogether." 21 As the fourteenth-century Dominican Thomas of Waleys warns, "'Words easily pass out of the memory,'" so that "'from forgetting a single syllable, one forgets everything. Thus, the preacher can be confounded because he has bound himself to the words rather than to their gist. '" 22 Waleys' s concern with memory, books, and pulpit oratory comes increasingly to the fore in the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries, when Anglican preachers were subject "to increasing attacks for their reliance on notes, a practice that distinguished them from dissenting preachers (who prided themselves on an ability to speak from memory), and which, critics complained, resulted in faltering, lackluster sermons." 23 William Fulwood' s translation of Gratarolo' s popular and much reprinted De Memoria Reparanda cautions:"Take heede least the writtinge of thinges doe not hurt your Memorye, to witte, least you counting those thynges to be sure and stedfast, which you haue written in your Booke of remembraunce, doe ceasse to thincke anye more of them, and so trustinge to that securitie, doe suffer them to slippe oute of your minde." 24 Bishop Reynolds, too, avers that among the causes of "weaknesse in the Memorie" is "a distrust, and from thence an unexercise of it. Whereupon Plato telleth us, that the use of Letters, in gathering Adversaria and Collections, is a hinderance to the Memorie; because those things which we have deposited to our Desks, wee are the more secure and carelesse to retaine in our Minds." 25 Carruthers is right, I think, to point out that the stability of individual identity is guaranteed in the classical and medieval worlds through communal memory, "accessed by an individual through education, which acts to ' complete' uninformed individual experience." 27 The primacy of shared cultural and civic bonds, "whether that of civitas Romana or civitas Dei," maintains in practice the necessary adequation between (and separation of ) figure and copy. 28 However, in stressing continuities, her narrative minimizes the tensions inhering in both classical and medieval approaches to memory, which often surface in diverse spaces not directly linked to the mnemonic tradition. My reading of The Comedy of Errors seeks to resurrect those tensions by arguing that the play is concerned with the difficulties of demarcating a self that can be set against its communally created mnemonic double. 29 I shall return shortly to the problem of writing. But first let us trace the work of the eikón in The Comedy of Errors by examining the play' s persistent anxiety regarding likenesses and substitution. Choosing to be alone early in the play, Antipholus of Syracuse immediately voices the concern that imaging the self may lead, ironically, to despair and an utter loss of identity. He compares himself to "a drop of water / That in the ocean seeks another drop, / Who, falling there to find his fellow forth, / Unseen, inquisitive, confounds himself " (1.2.35-38). The search for his exact match seems shadowed by failure to project outward into the world. The "interjected 'unseen,'" as Douglas Lanier has noted, suggests that "the single gaze of his 'fellow,' a gaze in which he might find himself, is set against the engulfing gaze of the world, a gaze that fails to see him." 30 The paradox that the desire to find the self demands its loss is further conveyed on the phenomenal level. 31 The alliterative multiplication of f sounds in line 37 drowns singularity in a mechanical repetition that exceeds the speaker' s intention or choice. The language of self-loss echoes in the brief scene where these lines occur: Antipholus' s fear that in the "quest" for his mother and brother he will "lose" himself (l. 40) is preceded by his self-avowed intention 26 to "lose" himself by wandering "up and down to view the city" (ll. 30-31). 32 The comic irony is, of course, that the loss he fears occurs directly after he expresses that fear, with Dromio of Ephesus entering to mistake him for his brother. As Harold Brooks notes, the descriptor with which Antipholus acknowledges Dromio' s entry-"Here comes the almanac of my true date" (l. 41)-"fits both the false inference from appearance, and the reality itself." 33 With this unexpected entry, then, the self ' s temporal fixing through that which ostensibly confirms its "true date" becomes unmoored. To Antipholus' s query regarding Dromio' s premature return ("How chance thou art returned so soon?" [l. 42]), the servant instead asserts his belatedness ("Returned so soon? Rather approached too late" [l. 43]) before thrusting the mistaken master into a vibrantly material present that will, however, only further dissolve the contours of Antipholus of Syracuse' s reality:"The capon burns, the pig falls from the spit. / The clock hath strucken twelve upon the bell; / My mistress made it one upon my cheek" (ll. 44-46).
Whereas the Syracusan Antipholus confronts the fluidity and uncertainty of personal identity, his Ephesian twin insists on the fixity of his own self, reflected back to him by his possessions and his social standing. The brothers' starkly contrasted experiences in the play correspond to this divergence of attitudes toward identity and personhood. The Syracusan brother marvels that There' s not a man I meet but doth salute me As if I were their well-acquainted friend, And every one doth call me by my name. Some tender money to me, some invite me, Some other give me thanks for kindnesses.
(4.3.1-5) By contrast, his fraternal "other" is denied entry into his own house, arrested, accused of being possessed, and finally bound over to Pinch, who throws him into a "dark and dankish vault" (5.1.248).
32 Antipholus' s words return to haunt him when Adriana passionately asks him (without realizing the literal truth of her words) "O, how comes it, / That thou art then estrangèd from thyself? " (2.2.110-11). "For know, my love," she continues, "as easy mayst thou fall / A drop of water in the breaking gulf, / And take unmingled thence that drop again / Without addition or diminishing, / As take from me thyself, and not me too" (ll. 116-20). The word easy here means just the reversethat is, impossible. But the difficulty takes two different paths: either because falling into the "breaking gulf " undoes the discrete identity of the drop, mingling it with the body of water into which it has fallen; or because each drop is just like the other and therefore indistinguishable-as the duke will later remark,"These two Antipholus', these two so like, / And these two Dromios, one in semblance" (5.1.347-48). Both readings resonate with sentiments voiced earlier by Antipholus of Syracuse himself.
33 Brooks, 59.
Yet against these differences between attitudes and behaviors works the name, "confound[ing]" (1.2.38) and merging the brothers. The "kindness" of one brother is transferred to the other through the name that "every one doth call" him. As the flabbergasted Antipholus of Syracuse wonders aloud to his Dromio,"How can she [Adriana] thus then call us by our names-/ Unless it be by inspiration?" (2.2.157-58). The paradox of the name is established early in the play. Recalling the birth of his sons, Egeon remarked on the near-impossibility of telling them apart: "And, which was strange, the one so like the other / As could not be distinguished but by names" (1. 1.51-52 ). An odd locution, since it is precisely their names that do not distinguish them! As we have seen, the confusion of names contributes indirectly to the failure of Egeon' s plea for succor in the closing scene. 34 Equally noteworthy is how the problem of their names has deposited its traces in what we might call the textual memory of The Comedy of Errors, its published form in the 1623 Folio. This "authoritative text is marked," Harry Levin tells us, by "the ambiguity of some names in stage directions and in speech prefixes. . . . E. Dro. is, as might be expected, Dromio of Ephesus; but E. Ant. is Antipholus of Syracuse, an abbreviation of his earlier designation, Ant. Errotis-which is perhaps an approximation of erraticus, wandering." 35 Levin' s helpful clarification no doubt dispels the confusion for us and locates "error" in the difference between the solid citizen and his wandering twin. But it doesn't remove the peculiarity of the error: aptly enough, even here the name intended to distinguish between the twins-Ant. E[rrotis]-becomes the very name that "confounds" them-Ant. E [phesus] .
The name thus preserves identity and personhood, as in Simonides' s memorial feat, but only at a cost. The doubling in the name awakes the specter of the Doppelgänger who threatens to possess or to steal the self. Antipholus of Syracuse voices just such a fear early in the play:
They say this town is full of cozenage, As nimble jugglers that deceive the eye, Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind, Soul-killing witches that deform the body. . . .
(1.2.97-100) 36 34 Egeon' s phrase has generally been taken to mean that the family originally gave the twins different names. This perfectly reasonable explanation does not, of course, diminish its oddity for us. 35 Harry Levin, ed., The Comedy of Errors (New York: New American Library, 1965), 114. While noting that Antipholus of Syracuse is brought in as "Erotes" and once as "Errotis," Dorsch does not remark in the introduction to his New Cambridge edition on the ambiguity of "E. (Ant)," remaining content with Levin' s explanation. Dorsch does point out, however, that the form erraticus does not occur in Plautus (8).
36 Even Antipholus' s acknowledgment, cited above, of the warmth of his reception in Ephesus leads to a similar conclusion: "Even now," he continues,"a tailor called me in his shop / And showed Antipholus' s nightmarish vision evokes an Aristotelian configuration linking selfhood to knowledge and memory. Soul in this tradition was the whole organization and function of a human being, whose memory images were results of physiological processes involving the eye (through which images or likenesses were received), the mind (on which these images were materially impressed), and the body (which determined the ability to retain the impression). 37 By threatening to "deceive the eye," "change the mind," and "deform the body," the Ephesian world endangers the very mechanism of recollection through which the soul maintains itself, putting at risk the identity preserved in the (supposed) singularity of the name.
In truth, as Roman Jakobson has pointed out, the very notion of a proper name is structurally marked by a circularity. " [T] he general meaning of a proper name cannot be defined without reference to the code. In the code of English,'Jerry' means a person named Jerry. The circularity is obvious: the name means anyone to whom this name is assigned." 38 That the Shakespearean text pushes this circularity to the breaking point is evidenced by the Dromios, who bear the brunt of their masters' confusion. The second pair of twins not only draws attention to the phenomenon of doubling by duplicating it, but also enacts a merger of persons-one that threatens the Antipholi without entirely overwhelming them-in which the Dromios share not only a name but also the punishment attendant on giving the right things to the wrong brother.
Their indistinguishability extends even further, however, to encompass their bodies as well. The physical marks that in other Shakespearean plays index uniqueness signally fail here to serve that purpose. Consider, for example, how in Twelfth Night the "mole upon the brow" (5.1.236) allows Sebastian and Viola to establish their sharing of a father, or, in Cymbeline, how the mole convinces Posthumus that Iachimo has "tasted" Imogen "in bed" (2.4.57). 39 In contrast, recall Dromio of me silks that he had bought for me, / And therewithal took measure of my body. / Sure, these are but imaginary wiles, / And Lapland sorcerers inhabit here" (4.3.7-11). These intimations of the supernatural further undermine the distinction between the twins. Appropriately, the Ephesian brother seems possessed by the Syracusan' s language when he calls the local "conjuror," the Schoolmaster Pinch, "a hungry, lean-faced villain, / A mere anatomy, a mountebank, / A threadbare juggler and a fortune-teller, / A needy, hollow-eyed, sharp-looking wretch, / A living dead man" (5. Ephesus' s response to his brother' s betrothed, the globe-like Nell. The "privy marks" of identity, which Nell names in order to assert her rightful possession of Dromio, are transformed into the signs of demonic possession.
To conclude, this drudge or diviner laid claim to me, called me Dromio, swore I was assured to her, told me what privy marks I had about me, as the mark of my shoulder, the mole in my neck, the great wart on my left arm, that I, amazed, ran from her as a witch.
(3.2.124-28)
Self-possession in Comedy of Errors is undermined by the doubling of the name and by the doubling of the remembered body to which the name refers. 40 Created in the process is the nightmare of being possessed by alien and malign powers, by a distorted world explicitly situated, as the earlier "find[ing] out [of ] countries" (l. 104) suggested, in the female body. In this scene the self is "confounded" by being confronted with its ultimate eikón, the uncanny double bearing the same "privy marks" of names and physical features. Even if one obliquely "finds" the matching drop, the discovery does not vitiate the possibility of being engulfed. Fleeing from Nell, Dromio of Syracuse enters the stage seeking confirmation of his self from his master: "Do you know me sir? Am I Dromio? Am I your man? Am I myself? " (l. 72).
MEMORY AND MARKET
The Comedy of Errors ends with a tamed version of this potentially terrifying scenario. The plot returns, after all, to its farcical rather than philosophical sources. But what is it that still needs to be tamed at the end of this erratic comedy? What rouses memory' s specters and activates a doubling secreted within the very structure of memory? How does the constitutive figure of memory, the double, turn into the very thing that threatens memory? And-with it-all that depends on memory: identity, personhood, life itself? A clue may be found in Dromio of Ephesus' s corporeal memories of his beatings: "Say what you will, sir," he tells his master, . . . but I know what I know: That you beat me at the mart I have your hand to show. If the skin were parchment and the blows you gave were ink, Your own handwriting would tell you what I think.
(3.1.11-14) 40 On the rhetorical dimensions of such doubling, see Patricia Parker' s passing remarks in Literary Fat Ladies: "The play exploits the full range of verbal and other doublings . . . ; the ironic playing on the citizen twin as ' second to none' in the city (V.i.7); or the constant exploitation of amphibology, a form of speech which looks two ways at once" (70).
That the doubling of memory is akin to the act of writing belongs by now to our received understanding of the subject. It therefore comes as no surprise that Dromio, too, recounts the memory of his mistreatment in terms of a writing upon his body. 41 At the same time, the memory of these graphic marks echoes and reiterates his description in 1.2 of the unwanted guerdon for his services. Responding to Antipholus of Syracuse' s demand to know where his thousand gold marks have been stowed, Dromio of Ephesus says:
I have some marks of yours upon my pate, Some of my mistress' marks upon my shoulders, But not a thousand marks between you both. If I should pay your worship those again, Perchance you will not bear them patiently.
(1.2.82-86)
In their juxtaposition, these two quotations fold writing, corporeal signs, and money into one other. What distinguishes the subject-the "privy marks" written on his body-graphically migrates into the monetary "mark," the medium enabling the exchange of commodities. But at a price: for what disappears in the money-form is the uniqueness of the commodity, that which constitutes its "privy" nature. 42 This tension allows us, I think, to adduce another, historically specific context that affects memory in Shakespeare' s play. It is the place where the bulk of the play' s confusions proliferate: the market. Not only does Shakespeare shift the setting from the Epidamnum of his Plautine source to the major mercantile center of Ephesus, but the play also structures the transformation of selves through the movement of money and commodities, concrete properties to which the very beings of the protagonists seem attached. 43 The thousand marks set as ransom for Egeon' s life 41 In his persuasive reading of the play, Lanier notes that the term character itself springs from the Greek word carattin, meaning to inscribe or wound. Metaphors of reading and writing abound in the play, beyond the repeated references to time' s handwriting and the marks legible upon the bodies of the Dromios. Admonishing Antipholus of Syracuse, for instance, Luciana demands that he not let her sister "read" his "false love" in his eyes (3.2.9), for " 'tis double wrong to truant with your bed / And let her read it in thy looks at board" (3.2.17-18). And in the concluding scene, the duke wonders who can "decipher" the "natural man" from the "spirit" (5.1.333-34).
42 Dromio of Ephesus' s description of his master' s inexplicable behavior, in lines that anticipate passages in The Merchant of Venice, stresses Antipholus' s obsession with money: "' 'Tis dinner-time', quoth I.'My gold', quoth he. / 'Your meat doth burn', quoth I.'My gold', quoth he. / 'Will you come?' quoth I. 'My gold', quoth he; / 'Where is the thousands marks I gave thee, villain?'" (2.1.60-63). 43 Charles Haines remarks on the play' s "compelling interest in commerce" and "the tyranny of money" in "Some Notes on Love and Money in The Comedy of Errors," Critical Dimensions: English, (1.1.21-22) becomes the text' s refrain, reappearing in the following scene as the very sum that Antipholus of Syracuse entrusts to his Dromio (1.2.81). 44 What seems to haunt the play is the fantasized and nightmarish threat of the market, of a space and a process of doubling, exchange, and possession, wherein people, things, identities, and attributes endlessly circulate. 45 An oft-cited passage from John Wheeler' s 1601 A Treatise of Commerce bears eloquent witness to the effects of the market on the texture of quotidian life in Elizabethan England:
[T]he Prince with his subiects, the Maister with his seruants, one friend and acquaintance with another, the Captaine with his souldiers, the Husband with his wife, Women with and among themselues, and in a word, all the world choppeth and changeth, runneth & raueth after Marts, Markets and Merchandising, so that all thinges come into Commerce, and passe into traffique (in a maner) in all times, and in all places: not onely that, which nature bringeth forth, as the fruits of the earth, the beasts and liuing creatures, with their spoiles, skinnes and cases, the mettals, minerals, and such like things, but further also, this man maketh merchandise of the workes of his owne handes, this man of another mans labour, one selleth words, another maketh t[r]affike of the skins & bloud of other men, yea there are some found so subtill and cunning merchants, that they perswade and induce men to suffer themselues to bee bought and sold. . . . 46 Wheeler' s description testifies to the sheer profusion of market commodities. The energy of the market resides in its omnivorous absorption of all the things through which its presence is known and felt. The fluidity of this process suggests the equivalence of all natural and social processes through commodification.
But even in Wheeler an older world peeps through the paratactic chain with which he begins, a world whose operative distinctions are hierarchical (prince and 44 As Brooks has noted, the link between the framing story and the main action is strengthened by reference to the three themes already raised in the Egeon episode: risk, wealth, and time. "The theme of moneyed wealth is emphasized by stage-'business'. . . . The bag of money is to furnish one of the two subjects of the first comic misunderstanding . . . ; moreover, it will form a parallel with the gold chain and the purse, other concrete visible properties which carry on the theme and become foci of similar cross-purposes in subsequent Acts" (56-57). 45 Roger Warren indicates that the 1976 Stratford production emphasized this dimension by transforming "the permanent set into a contemporary, cluttered Turkish market," over which the balcony of Adriana' s house was perched. Egeon himself was "clearly in the rag-trade" ("Theory and subject, master and servant), patriarchal (husband and wife), and communal (among friends, acquaintances, and women). It is precisely the qualitative distinctions among these sorts of relationships that are gradually dissolved by the logic of money and commodity circulation. And it is between these poles that The Comedy of Errors oscillates. On the one hand, we confront the image of a world governed by a strict hierarchy that establishes and maintains personhood and identity. As Luciana preaches to Adriana:
There' s nothing situate under heaven' s eye But hath his bound in earth, in sea, in sky. The beasts, the fishes, and the wingèd fowls Are their males' subjects, and at their controls. Man, more divine, the master of all these. . . . Are masters to their females, and their lords. Then let your will attend on their accords.
(2.1.16-20, 24-25)
The play' s opening scene expresses this rigid hierarchy through the immutability of ducal justice, which refuses clemency because the duke is "not partial to infringe" the "laws" of the state (1.1.4). And yet, the duke' s honor and the law may be less immutable than they sound, for the state must make room for the market, allowing "guilders to redeem [the] lives" of those who fall foul of Ephesus' s "rigorous statutes" (ll. 8, 9). As a result, Egeon must die,"His goods confiscate to the Duke' s dispose, / Unless a thousand marks be levièd / To quit the penalty and to ransom him" (ll. 20-22, emphasis added). Thus we also confront a world of circulation in which transformation and, ultimately, degeneration threaten all things and all people. Adriana says, I see the jewel best enamellèd Will lose his beauty. Yet the gold bides still That others touch; and often touching will Wear gold, and no man that hath a name But falsehood and corruption doth it shame.
(2.1.107-11)
Unlike the distinct and unique jewel, gold endures even as its own physical identity (qua gold) "wear[s]" thin. It subsists not because it is unique, however, but rather because it is "often touch[ed]"-that is, because it is money. It "bides" because it circulates and enables in turn the circulation of people and things. While "often touching" transforms and diminishes gold' s physical material, its circulation nonetheless preserves its functional identity, the value inhering in its fungibility-but only at the risk of dividing value, of substituting the copy (the image of value, money) for the original figure (gold, the metallic representation of value). Just as converting objects into other objects affects the fundamental nature of gold, so, too, does the process of circulation (here, sexual circulation) corrupt and invert the original figure: the (over)use of the name (Antipholus) turns the person (the good namei.e, good repute) into the lie (the false Antipholus who consorts with women to whom he is not married). The other sense of wear likewise emphasizes the taint. The courtesan-a woman skilled in "often touching" (and being touched)-will shortly become the intended "wearer" of Adriana' s gold chain, turning through possession of that token into a potential substitute-as indeed Adriana fears she already is. 47 While Luciana' s sermon quoted above recalls the injunction from St. Paul' s Letter to the Ephesians ("Wives, submit yourselves unto your husbands, as unto the Lord" [5:22]) in order to insist on patriarchal hierarchy, Adriana' s lines about the touching of gold suggest that sexual-like monetary-circulation undermines those originary structures. Moreover, the biblical memory of The Comedy of Errors is itself bifurcated. If the play ultimately re-members the text of Ephesians in order to reconcile the divided families and, implicitly, the divided cities, it is worth recalling that such division resides in the story of Jacob and Esau,"the quintessential biblical gemini . . . whose history . . . does indeed go through various exchanges and crossings." 48 It would be a mistake, however, to conceive of the workings of memory and the market in The Comedy of Errors as distinct and separable-as if mercantile exchange were an external force eroding memory from without, putting into question memory' s ability to hold together everything "situate under heaven' s eye." The play' s peculiar insight resides rather in its realization that the nightmare of a ceaseless circulation of copies in place of the true images of things may simply enact the radical unfolding of memory itself. By virtue of a shared logic, mercantile doubling may thus be said to unleash a dynamic process that mirrors the very structure of memory.
For memory and money are linked-and, as the Simonides story suggests, always have been. The revelation of Simonides' s prodigious ability to preserve things as mental images is triggered, we should recall, by the dispute over payment for his bardic labor. In demanding that the poet "apply" to the twin gods for half the 47 The ironies of Adriana' s complaint are manifest. For one, the Antipholus she addresses is "false"-albeit in a sense different from the one she intends-and thus counterfeits the presence of her husband. Moreover, Adriana' s remarks look ahead not just to her "true" husband' s dalliance with the courtesan but also to this other Antipholus' s advances to her sister, Luciana. fee agreed on for his panegyric, the "wealthy nobleman" Scopas breaks with the customary poetic invocation of the divine, which symbolizes (and guarantees) the social order. The price of his "excessive meanness" is the destruction of order (preserved only in its image in Simonides' s mind). It hardly seems accidental that money should trigger not only the break from tradition but also the compensation for its human cost: the memorial feat that enables the victims to be identified and separately interred.
Indeed, a by-product of Carruthers' s study of memory in medieval culture is the persistent connection between memory and mercantilist practice. Reiterating the basic principles of classical mnemonics, the preface to Hugh of St. Victor' s Chronica, for instance, compares the mental ordering of things to be remembered with the way a money-changer "divides his one pouch into several compartments" so as to put all his unsorted coins "in their proper places, since the differentiation [distinctio] of his compartments preserves the separation and distinction of the items, and thus keeps them unmixed." 49 This arrangement enables "his ready hand without delay" to put each coin,"which he either may have wanted to receive or promised to give out, into a separate place without confusion." 50 An orderly transaction depends onand is mirrored in-the internal ordering of the pouch, for "it would provide onlookers with a spectacle silly and absurd enough, if, while his money-bag should pour forth so many varieties without muddle, this same bag, its mouth being opened, should not display on its inside an equivalent number of separate compartments." 51 As with the sacculum, so, too, with "the treasure-house of wisdom":
[There] are various sorts of wealth, and many filing-places in the storehouse of your heart. Gold is put in one place, in another silver, in another precious jewels. Their orderly arrangement is clarity of knowledge. . . . Confusion is the mother of ignorance and forgetfulness, but orderly arrangement illuminates the intelligence and firms up memory. 52 Shakespeare' s play reinforces the link between memory and market through one of the visible commodities-the golden chain-that both bind and sunder the confused protagonists. Promised by Antipholus of Ephesus to Adriana as a sign of their marital bond, the "carcanet" (3.1.4) suddenly signifies instead his possible infidelity. Mentioning the promise of the chain, Adriana confides to her sister that she wishes rather that "alone, a love he would detain / So he would keep fair quarter with his bed" (2.1.105-6). And soon thereafter Antipholus decides to "bestow" the chain on the courtesan that his wife "without desert . . . Hath oftentimes upbraided [him] withal" (3.1.118, 112-13). The metaphors of binding and loosing with which the play is replete find their instantiation in the golden chain, the errant circulation of which results in Antipholus of Ephesus' s being "attach[ed]" (4.1.73) not on a "band," as Adriana surmises, but "on a stronger thing: / A chain, a chain" (4.2.49-50), as Dromio of Ephesus quips. The chain joins what Marx calls "'the rag, tag, and bobtail of commodities'" 53 -here the ring, the rope, and the money bagthe unpredictable movement of which causes so much distress and confusion by literalizing the bewildering transformation of objects through their circulation in a monetary economy.
Significantly, the metaphor of the chain occupies an important place in mnemonic practice as well. Thomas Aquinas was famous, Carruthers notes, for storing "his reading from various libraries in his memory, to be pulled forth as a seamless golden chain, Catena aurea." 54 The term was used to refer in particular to "'that admirable compilation of Patristic texts on the four Gospels which he made for Pope Urban . . . and which, for the most part, he seems to have put together from texts that he had read and committed to memory from time to time while staying in various religious houses.'" 55 By the Renaissance, Aquinas' s exemplary feat had been turned into mnemonic prescription, as John Willis' s Mnemonica makes evident: "the Method ought to be so disposed, that every part of an entire Speech, and every sentence of those parts, precede according to their dignity in nature . . . like as one link draweth another in a Golden Chain; therefore Method is called the Chain of Memory." 56 But if such "arrangement"-be it of money bag or mind-seems to signify the proper, fixed arrangement of elements, the ostensibly static ordering conceals an underlying dynamic whereby the distributed elements could be fluidly mixed, generating new combinations. And it is precisely the transformative power deriving from the circulation of a closed set of elements that drives Shakespeare' s comedy forward, creating the vortex into which its characters are drawn. The very organization that enables Hugh of St. Victor' s money-changer to preserve "the separation and distinction of the items" potentially produces the "silly and absurd" spectacle which we recognize as The Comedy of Errors. Thus the double metaphor of the golden chain exposes a congruence between the operations of memory and market, indi- cating, in Goux' s words, "that a single structural process of exchange, one and the same 'mode of substitution,' could explain . . . both a signifying process [memory] and an economic process [commodity circulation]." 57 To pursue the logic common to mnemonic and mercantile doubling, it is worth turning briefly to a different commercial center-that of fifteenth-century Florence-where we encounter the curious genre of the libri di famiglia, the usually private diaries in which merchant-oligarchs represented their personal concerns and values. Stephanie Jed' s rich reading of these documents shows how Florentine humanist projects that aimed at graphic reform and the restoration of "philologically chaste relations with the narratives of Republican Rome" were conditioned by merchants' writing culture (even as the links between mercantilism and humanism were increasingly denied and, gradually, effaced). 58 An editorial change made by Francesco Guicciardini to one of his own libri di famiglia reveals most clearly the space shared by humanism and mercantilism in the Renaissance. Guicciardini places his manuscript under the rubric of memoria, or memoir: "'In this book by me, Francesco di Piero Guicciardini, Doctor of Law, I will record [si farà memoria] some things belonging to me, beginning from the day I was born. . . .'" 59 However, close study shows that under memoria, Guicciardini had originally written conto, that is, "account," with all its attendant mercantile connotations. According to Jed, the alteration indicates Guicciardini' s conscious decision to assimilate his writing into the humanistic category of historiography, thereby suppressing its subterranean links with mercantile writing. At the same time, though, the very coexistence of conto and memoria as categories available for the representation of writing by merchants suggests that the practices of accounting and those of memory were embedded within each other, were "literally stratified, one being represented under the other." 60 The intermingling of memorial and mercantile in the secret spaces of the libri di famiglia produces (perhaps unsurprisingly) the figure of the double and, in particular, the distinction between original and copy. Thus, Paolo da Certaldo' s collection of maxims advised merchants to protect against deceit by preparing both an official and a personal record:
Always when you have a notarial act prepared, have your book at hand and write in it the day on which it is prepared and the notary who prepares it and the wit- 57 nesses and why and with whom you are making the act. . . . And in order to avoid the many possibilities and dangers of false men, it should always be copied. 61 In line with such advice, the merchant Stefano Corsini points to a book "'written in [his] own hand'" in which he has entered "' every account and expense that we paid for the said Neri and Andrea.'" 62 To this primary record Corsini adds its secret double: he further claims to have "' a book in my possession, a copy of the said book so that if ever, at any time, the said Neri and Andrea file a lawsuit or dispute or other petition, find the said book and believe those writings and nothing else.'" 63 The personal copy here becomes crucial to defending the mercantile transaction and its record; it replaces the original as the image of truth. A similar doubling and substitution is later advocated by Guicciardini when he explains that because "the 'passage of time' provides ' occasions and necessities' for falsifying documents," it may become necessary to "' defend . . .' the accuracy of original documents by means of a copy." 64 It is noteworthy that the copy assumes importance in Florentine mercantilist writing as a defense against generalized deceit. The Comedy of Errors offers a comparable conjunction, even as it reverses its valence. As we have seen, Antipholus of Syracuse' s soliloquy, in which he "confounds" himself in seeking "his fellow forth," leads directly into the first of the play' s confusions of identity: Dromio of Ephesus enters to call his own master to dinner, only to be surprised by Antipholus' s repeated demand to know "Where is the gold I gave in charge to thee?" (1.2.70). If the meeting of doubles throws into disarray the individual' s sense of self (his status as "original," we might say), this process crucially involves money. Unknowingly encountering the "false" servant, Antipholus' s sole concern is for the safekeeping of the "thousand marks thou hadst of me" (l. 81). Their short exchange is driven by Antipholus' s repetition of the same question ("where is the money?") in six different ways, and culminates with his adding his "marks" to those that Dromio' s mistress had already inscribed on the poor servant' s shoulders (ll. 83ff ). Indeed, Antipholus' s anger at Dromio' s alleged deceit-"by some device or other," he fears, the servant "is o'er-raught of all my money" (ll. 95-96)-introduces the moral dimension of accounting as well, in that he couches his demands in terms of mercantile responsibility."We being strangers here, how dar' st thou trust," he thunders, "So great a charge from thine own custody?" (ll. 60-61). Or again,"tell me how has 61 Paolo da Certaldo, quoted here from Jed, 92. 62 Stefano Corsini, quoted here from Jed, 93. 63 Corsini, quoted here from Jed, 93. 64 Guicciardini, quoted here from Jed, 93-94. Jed herself does not pursue the significance of such doubling, focusing instead on how the concern with authenticity reveals a moral dimension of the mercantilist relationship with writing. thou disposed of thy charge" (l. 73). Upon Dromio' s taking to his heels without proffering a satisfactory answer, Antipholus immediately projects the specter of a town "full of cozenage" and "jugglers that deceive the eye"-in which he now includes the no-longer "trusty villain" Dromio (l. 19). As in the Florentine libri, monetary transactions seem surrounded by the possibility of deception and fraud. But if in the memoria or conto the copy was enlisted to verify the original transaction, by contrast, the double' s appearance in the sorcerous world of Ephesus introduces the possibility of an unbounded deception that can "change the mind" and "deform the body" (ll. 99-100). And yet in both cases, the emergence of the copy reveals a fundamental instability that calls the original into question-the integrity of the commercial transaction in one case, the merchant' s body (and money) in the other. No wonder, then, that Antipholus departs the scene "greatly fear [ing] " that his "money is not safe" (l. 105).
In drawing out these connections between Errors and the Florentine libri, I wish to suggest that what overthrows established social bonds grows out of a mnemonic and mercantile doubling that underwrites equally the stability and maintenance of the social whole. For much of the play it is less the shared communal memory conferred by a secular or religious civitas than the recognition of one' s self by another that supports individual identity; mutual recognition occupies the site of communal memory, providing the mechanism through which an individual "completes" himself. But because memory and market share an underlying logic of the double, the historical expansion of the market exposes a dynamic inhering in memory itself. Antipholus of Syracuse' s acknowledgment that he "confounds himself " in so far as he remains " [u] nseen" by his "fellow" drop hints at a crisis of communal memory in a world where the fluidity of mercantile exchange both disrupts and substitutes for the continuity that shared recollection formerly held in place. "I am transformèd, master, am I not?" (2.2.186), Dromio of Syracuse anxiously asks, needing to be seen and recognized in order to be himself. And it is a question he must repeat in different forms even though the answers no longer reassure: The rapidly amplifying quibble on the word mark, noted earlier, suggests that the marking of memory to establish identity and personhood is inseparable (at least for a bond-man) from the mercantile marks through which memory' s bonds are dissolved. The figure that connects memory and market is the written or graphic mark, which has the power to absorb and potentially nullify the distinction between private and public, inside and outside, self and other.
re-possessing a lost life in its fullness. Unlooked for, unexpected-or, in the duke' s words,"accidentally . . . met" (l. 351)-such redemption seeks to withdraw life from circulation not by negating exchange but by grafting onto it a surplus value. Not only does Egeon' s redemption depend on a mnemonic doubling-his being recognized by Aemilia-but the circuit of monetary redemptions must be closed: the ring returned to the courtesan, the fate of the chain clarified, the purse of ducats offered for Antipholus' s bail and Egeon' s release. But on these mnemonic and monetary redemptions, which merely compensate for prior losses, the play confers an additional, specifically Christian meaning-even as it models this surplus value on an economic logic of return on investment. In so doing, it seeks to recreate, as it were, the civitas dei so central to earlier configurations of communal memory, but on a new basis of market and mercantile exchange. At the play' s conclusion, zoón and eikón are held (more or less stably) apart by the recognition that there were in fact two originals to begin with, permitting the past to be reconstituted in terms of a prior ordering of the world. The "fat friend" who had "kitchened me for you today," Dromio of Syracuse says, "shall be my sister, not my wife" (ll. 414-16). Dromio diffuses the threat of polyandry, just as pairing Luciana with the Syracusan Antipholus has warded off bigamy. The ideal vision of a world ordered by unambiguous kinship relations is thus restored, and the doubling of identity is then comically reduced to the stability of a mirror image, whose lack of one dimension ensures its difference from the original it doubles. Dromio of Ephesus says to his twin,"Methinks you are my glass, and not my brother. / I see by you I am a sweet-faced youth" (ll. 418-19). The "glass" counters the distorting effects of memory' s temporal doubling, undoing the "strange defeatures" which "time' s deformèd hand" has written on this play.
But even Dromio' s playful image elicits a sense of fragility. For none of the protagonists seems willing-with good reason-to commit fully to what the eye sees. Asked to identify the gold chain, Antipholus of Syracuse only tentatively ventures his assent ("I think it be, sir. I deny it not" [l. 378]), his uncertainty echoed by the goldsmith who hesitantly agrees that he arrested the wrong brother ("I think I did, sir. I deny it not" [l. 380]). The duke' s anxiety, too, is palpable in his refusal to let the two Antipholi approach one another, even after he has learned the truth:"Stay, stand apart. I know not which is which" (l. 364). Likewise, Dromio' s "Methinks," which introduces the play' s closing exchange, conveys a nervousness at having narrowly escaped losing himself, making him eager to see in his twin not brotherhood but a mirror image that will guarantee his own identity. And yet the twin is both "glass" and "brother": what Dromio jokingly presents as a mutually exclusive alternative actually functions as a doubling, a supplement.
Just as Christian redemption signifies a shedding of the body and its stigmata, a divine forgetting of earthly travail, so, too, the Abbess "deciphers" (l. 334) the play by erasing time' s marks. 72 In Cicero' s anecdote Simonides' s memory is directed not at overcoming death but at enabling the living to mourn: by identifying the bodies, he ensures that friends can bury them separately. By contrast, in promising "full satisfaction" to "all that are assembled in this place, / That by this sympathizèd one day' s error / Have suffered wrong" (ll. 396-99), Aemilia seeks to overcome earthly memory itself. Both state and market, the powerful frames of Shakespeare' s own world, are displaced by a figure potent only in memory: a female ruler in a church both post-Classical and pre-Elizabethan. Thus the resonance and uneasiness of this errant comedy persist even in its happy ending: only by removing The Comedy of Errors to a theatrical world of un-Elizabethan hierarchy does Shakespeare resolve his remarkable fiction of double trouble. 72 The duke uses this same word to register his amazement at seeing the identical twins. The strongest-if somewhat one-sided-reading of the play' s Christian "mysteries" remains Arthur F. Kinney' s "Shakespeare's Comedy of Errors and the Nature of Kinds" (cited in n. 7, above).
